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McCann: Is Age Just a Number: The Intersection of the Fair Labor Standard

IS AGE JUST A NUMBER: THE INTERSECTION OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
I. ADDICTION TO THE GAME: AN INTRODUCTION
DEVELOPMENT OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

TO THE

Change has only just begun in the world of professional
sports.1 When thinking of professional athletes, many think of
those who played their sport in college and were drafted afterwards.2 Rarely would the thought of a minor come to mind.3 Even
more unbelievable would be a fifteen-year-old.4 However, in June
2021, the United States District Court for the District of Oregon
ruled in favor of fifteen-year-old O.M. in her fight to be allowed to
enter the National Women’s Soccer League (“NWSL”).5 This vic1. See O.M. v. Nat’l Women’s Soccer League, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1077
(D. Or. 2021) [hereinafter O.M.] (ruling O.M. met burden of showing preliminary
injunction is appropriate to stop National Women’s Soccer League (“NWSL”)
from enforcing Age Rule, therefore, allowing fifteen-year-old O.M. to play in
NWSL). This decision recognizes the protections provided to rules made under
collective bargaining agreements and acknowledges that the league still may enter
into a collective bargaining agreement with the National Women’s Soccer League
Players Association to impose such a rule. See id. at 1075 (noting that collective
bargaining agreement would change circumstances of this case). However, because this rule was imposed prior to the formation of a Players Association and
without a collective bargaining agreement, the court held the injunction was appropriate. See id. at 1066 (explaining collective bargaining agreement would have
not allowed for this injunction to be imposed)
2. See NFL Players By College On 2020 Rosters, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2020-09-07/nflplayers-college-2020-rosters#:~:text=10.&text=Out%20of%20the%201%2C696
%20players,percent)%20come%20from%20FBS%20schools [https://perma.cc/
JZ52-KX3M] (noting in 2020, of 1696 players in NFL’s active rosters, 1512 came
from NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision schools before being drafted into
NFL).
3. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (noting plaintiff in O.M. was fifteen years
old). For further discussion of how plaintiffs in other cases were either seventeen
or eighteen years old, and thus exempt from child labor regulations, see infra
notes 32–55 and accompanying text.
4. See TJ Mathewson, How Young Is Too Young To Play Professional Sports?,
GLOBAL SPORTS MATTER (Apr. 25, 2019), https://globalsportmatters.com/culture/
2019/04/25/how-young-is-too-young-to-play-professional-sports/#:~:text=the
%20NFL%20requires%20athletes%20to,and%2017%20for%20international%20players [https://perma.cc/HN88-RUSL] (noting various age rules imposed by different professional leagues ranging from seventeen years old to twenty
years old).
5. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (discussing result for then fifteen-year-old
to enter professional ranks in NWSL).
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tory for O.M. has now opened the doors up to minors to enter professional sports more than ever before.6 With this new territory
comes new regulations.7 Leagues and teams may be left considering many open-ended questions.8 However, they should primarily
focus on child labor laws.9
Since the late 1800s, professional sports have been a classic
American pastime.10 Not surprisingly, since the mid-1900s, sportsrelated industries have rapidly expanded and become entrenched
in American society.11 Now a billion-dollar business, professional
sports attract millions of viewers.12 The increased importance of
sports in American society brings a naturally occurring increase in
competition among athletes and a proportionally smaller likelihood of becoming a professional athlete.13 According to the Na6. See id. at 1077 (setting forth new precedent by permitting fifteen-year-old
minor athlete to compete in NWSL). The court closed its opinion acknowledging
the “irreparable injury” to O.M. was not “counterbalanced by any cognizable
harm” to the NWSL from a temporary injunction. See id. (issuing preliminary injunction against Defendant’s Age Rule).
7. For further discussion of how child labor laws came into existence and how
they apply to sports, see infra notes 56–83 and accompanying text.
8. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1074 (noting NWSL speculated court allowing
minors to enter league “could further increase administrative costs” as one of
many concerns with court granting O.M. ability to enter league).
9. See Ben Gipson & Benjamin R. Mulcahy, Minors In Pro Esports Bring 3 Critical
Legal Considerations, DLA PIPER (July 28, 2020), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/
insights/publications/2020/07/minors-in-pro-esports-bring-3-critical-legal-considerations/ [https://perma.cc/PJY6-4AFM] (analogizing e-sport issues employers
have to consider when employing minors that are applicable to sports generally).
10. See Steven A. Riess, Professional Team Sports in the United States, OXFORD
RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. HIST. (Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://oxfordre.com/americanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-198 [https://perma.cc/HP86-L9FK] (noting professional
baseball quickly developed into “national pastime”); see also Ryan Quackenbush,
The Economic Impact Of Professional Sports In The United States, at 5 (Dec. 16,
2020) (Masters Synthesis, SUNY Brockport), https://soar.suny.edu/bitstream/
handle/20.500.12648/3959/pes_synthesis/110/fulltext%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=Y [https://perma.cc/Z4E6-FC22] (highlighting importance
of sports in American society, including how sports have developed over time).
11. See Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 5 (noting sports in American society
have maintained their importance).
12. See Christina Gough, Sports on U.S. TV – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Mar.
10, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/2113/sports-on-tv/ [https://
perma.cc/Z2NK-K3ZH ] (discussing substantial impact of professional sports of
television in United States). Especially now, as 90% of sports fans are willing to pay
for sports programing, the value of NFL television contracts is six billion dollars,
the average cost of commercials during Game Five of the NBA finals is $751,000,
the Major League Soccer (“MLS”) Cup Final receives two million viewers, and the
MLB World Series receives 9.78 million viewers. See id. (noting viewer habits and
viewer willingness to pay for subscription services in order to view sporting events).
13. See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/
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tional College Athletic Association (“NCAA”), in 2019, only about
4.2% of eligible players were drafted into the National Basketball
Association (“NBA”) and 3.8% of eligible players were drafted into
the National Football League (“NFL”).14 Despite these relatively
minuscule numbers, the competition to become professional has
only increased.15
This Comment analyzes the intersection between professional
sports and child labor laws and regulations under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”).16 Section II discusses court cases where
athletes filed suit against professional organizations over age restrictions under the Sherman Antitrust Act.17 Section II also examines
the history of the FLSA, why it was enacted, its child labor provisions, and provides an overview of efforts made by states to incorporate the FLSA. Further, this Section will introduce the case that
identifies the need to acknowledge the FLSA within sports.18 Section III discusses the results of prior cases and their similarities with
each other, the courts neglect of minor professional athletes and
the FLSA, and the impact the FLSA presents.19 This Comment
closes with remarks on what the future will hold in this area of
law.20
research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics [https://
perma.cc/AMA4-NMUR] (discussing likelihood college athletes make it into professional leagues).
14. See id. (noting small percentage of athletes actually making it out of college sports into professional leagues.)
15. See Number of NCAA College Athletes Reaches All-time High, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/number-ncaa-college-athletes-reaches-all-time-high [https://
perma.cc/M8KC-ZXLJ] (noting opportunity to compete in college athletics continues to rise). However, while the number of competing students may be increasing, the percentage of those who make it past college is not. See Estimated Probability
of Competing in Professional Athletics, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Apr. 8,
2020), https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2015/3/6/estimated-probability-of-competing-in-professional-athletics.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JAH-M6W2] (identifying almost 500,000 student athletes within NCAA, noting low percentage of those
athletes entering professional league).
16. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201–213 (1938) (LexisNexis 2021) (noting section of FLSA addresses child labor law, so was blueprint
for later imposed Department of Labor and State Department regulations on
topic).
17. For further discussion of the intersection between professional sports and
age restrictions, see infra notes 32–55 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of the case history and precedent leading up to the
current landscape, see infra notes 33–95 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the results in prior cases of minor athletes, see
infra notes 96 –180 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of the future of this area of law, see infra notes
181–189 and accompanying text.
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II. FIGHTING BACK: PREVAILING OVER RESTRICTIONS
Since the 1970s, case law has established that athletes are entitled to sue professional organizations for age and eligibility restrictions affecting entry into their leagues.21 In each case, the athletelitigant has challenged different restrictions, which when looked at
cumulatively, provides valuable insight into the current legal landscape of similar, though non-FLSA-related cases.22 The most relevant of these contexts falls under the scope of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, a 1890 statute prohibiting monopolistic business practices.23 More relevant to this Comment, the FLSA was enacted in
1938 to prohibit dangerous or unfair business practices as they pertain to children.24 The FLSA, like most federal laws and regulations, provides a floor for the states to abide by, but leaves the states
free to provide more protection than the federal government.25 Of
particular import are Oregon’s child labor provisions that were at
issue at issue in O.M. v. National Women’s Soccer League.26 However,
other states like New York and California have enacted and reinforced their position on specific rules regarding child professional
athletes.27 Section II will compare Oregon child labor laws with
FLSA Section 212.28 It will then continue by examining some
states’ efforts to incorporate minor athletes into FLSA exemptions.29 Finally, Section II introduces the case that necessitated consideration of the intersection between minor athletes and the

21. For further discussion of the case history of O.M., see infra notes 32–55
and accompanying text.
22. For further discussion of case history of athletes suing professional
leagues, see infra notes 35–57 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see infra notes 47–55
and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of the FLSA and why it was enacted, see infra notes
56–69 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the child labor provisions of the FLSA, see infra
notes 61–69 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of state child labor regulations in Oregon, see infra
notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
27. For further discussion of New York’s and California’s approaches to child
athletes, see infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act and its background, see infra notes 56–69 and accompanying text.
29. For further discussion of state legislation regarding minor athletes, see
infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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FLSA.30 Following discussion of the above, this Comment will delve
into the facts, holding, and rationale of O.M.31
A. Lawsuit Frenzy
Professional leagues such as the NFL and the NBA have a long
history of imposing and maintaining player age restrictions.32 In
the 1970s, Spencer Haywood, a basketball player for the Seattle
Sonics, brought suit against the NBA for not allowing him to play
until four years after high school graduation.33 After signing with
the Seattle Sonics, but less than four years after Haywood’s high
school class had graduated, the NBA threatened to disallow his contract.34 After the NBA made these threats, Haywood brought an
antitrust action against the NBA alleging that it was partaking in a
group boycott in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.35 Next, in
1977, Kenneth Linseman, a nineteen-year-old, sued the World
Hockey Association (“WHA”) because of a regulation that prohibited anyone under the age of twenty from playing professionally in
the league.36 Linseman was selected in the annual amateur draft of
the WHA by the Birmingham Bulls before he had turned twenty
30. For further discussion of O.M. v. Nat’l Women’s Soccer League, see infra
notes 84–95 and accompanying text.
31. For further discussion of O.M. v. Nat’l Women’s Soccer League, see infra
notes 84–102 and accompanying text.
32. For further discussion of age restrictions in professional leagues, see infra
notes 32–44 and accompanying text.
33. See Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204-05 (1971)
[hereinafter Haywood] (discussing how Haywood brought lawsuit against NBA because its rules prevented college players from being drafted until four years after
graduating high school, which is effectively twenty-two-year-old age requirement,
since Haywood had signed with Seattle less than four years after graduating high
school causing league to threaten to disallow contract, impose sanctions).
34. See id. at 1205 (discussing how Haywood came to sign with NBA’s Seattle
team, which resulted in his ineligibility under NBA rules).
35. See id. (noting lawsuit following from NBA’s threatening action against
Haywood). Haywood claimed that the NBA was partaking in a group boycott
against him similar to boycotts held unlawful in Fashion Originators’ Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) and Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Store, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) to show
per se violation of Sherman Antitrust Act. See id. at 1205 (noting prior case law
used by plaintiff in his action against NBA).
36. See Linseman v. World Hockey Assoc., 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Conn.
1977) [hereinafter Linseman] (discussing how WHA implemented “twenty-year-old
rule” to prohibit teams from drafting players who had not turned twenty during
calendar year of draft). The plaintiff was a nineteen-year-old amateur hockey
player who was contracted to play professionally for one of the teams. See id. (noting beginning cause of Linseman’s action was because he was drafted). He was
seeking a preliminary injunction under his claim that the rule violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. See id. (describing why Linseman was seeking preliminary injunction and what his argument was based on).
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years old.37 The league then informed Linseman and the Bulls that
their selection was null and void under the league’s regulations,
leading to his lawsuit.38
Following Linseman’s lawsuit, in 1984, Robert Boris brought
an action against the United States Football League (“USFL”) challenging their eligibility rules that prohibited players from joining
the league until they either used all of their college eligibility or five
years had passed since the player first entered college.39 A challenge of an eligibility rule is based on the set of rules that the NCAA
and league issues for student athletes in order to participate in a
particular sport.40 Finally, in 2004, the NFL found themselves in
the same legal battle after college football player Maurice Clarett
sued to have the league eliminate its draft eligibility requirement of
three seasons removed from their high school graduation.41
37. See id. at 1318 (discussing how Linseman was selected at draft on June 16,
1977, but his twentieth birthday was not until December 31, 1977, so he was not
twenty years old at time of draft).
38. See id. (discussing how President of WHA, William MacFarland, informed
Linseman and Linseman’s team that draft of Linseman was void under Section
17.2(a) of WHA’s Operating Regulations so he was not eligible to be drafted, including if draft decision was upheld, Linseman would be prohibited from playing
during 1977–1978 season).
39. See Boris v. United States Football League, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at
*3–7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Boris] (noting Robert Boris brought
action for injunction against USFL for violating Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust
Act). The USFL reasoned that the restriction was to “promote on-field competitive
balance among USFL teams; very few college-age athletes are physically, mentally,
or emotionally mature enough for professional football.” See id. at *3 (explaining
reasons defendants offered in support of eligibility rule imposed on players).
However, while the league’s reasons had some degree of merit, the court found
them to be ingenuine and as a way to help college football programs keep players
in the college league longer. See id. at *4 (noting court’s thoughts on defendant’s
arguments to justify eligibility rule imposed).
40. See Transfer Terms, N AT ’ L C OLLEGIATE A THLETIC A SS ’ N , https://
www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/transfer-terms [https://perma.cc/G9EEL5F7] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022) (explaining eligibility rules for NCAA); see also The
Rules of the Draft, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, (last visited
March 9, 2022), https://operations.nfl.com/journey-to-the-nfl/the-nfl-draft/therules-of-the-draft/ [https://perma.cc/PF87-QPB4] (explaining how players are eligible to play in both NCAA and NFL, based on requirements imposed by both).
41. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Clarett] (discussing how, like in Haywood, Clarett sued NFL for alleged
violations of Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act). The district court held that
eligibility rules were “not immune from antitrust scrutiny under the non-statutory
labor exemption.” See id. at 125 (noting circuit court restated opinion of district
court but disagreed with its conclusion, instead set forth its opinion explaining
why). However, on appeal, the Second Circuit said that the NFL’s labor market
was organized with collective bargaining and the teams could set terms and conditions of employment without risking antitrust liability. See id. at 130 (noting key
hole in Clarett’s argument against NFL). This is the same exemption that was
talked about in O.M., where the court acknowledged that if there were to be a
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Clarett was a former running back at Ohio State University and
gained national attention during his freshmen season.42 Prior to
beginning his sophomore season, he was suspended by Ohio State
University and forced to sit out his entire sophomore season.43
This led to his action against the NFL because he wanted to enter
the professional league, but the NFL draft eligibility restrictions
prohibited him.44
All of these cases share in common both some type of age restriction challenge and claims brought under the Sherman Antitrust Act.45 Specifically, these cases were brought under Section 1
collective bargaining agreement, O.M. could lose her injunction and ability to play
in the league. See O.M., No. 3:21-cv-00683-IM, 2021 WL 2478439, at *8 (D. Ore.
June 17, 2021) (describing consistently held belief in rulings by courts across
board that collective bargaining agreements avoid scrutiny under Section 1 of
Sherman Act).
42. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125-26 (noting Clarett was Big Ten freshman year,
first college freshmen since 1940s to open season as starter for Ohio State University). Further, Clarett had helped lead the team to an undefeated season and even
scored the winning touchdown in the 2003 Fiesta Bowl which claimed the national
championship. See id. at 126 (commenting on Clarett’s background and accomplishments as college athlete that led to his desire to enter league).
43. See id. (detailing events leading up to Clarett’s departure from Ohio State
Football); see also Associated Press, Clarett Allowed To Keep Scholarship, ESPN (Sept.
10, 2003), https://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=1612990
[https://perma.cc/6LHV-CK42] (noting Clarett’s suspension was unrelated to action against NFL). However, he was suspended from Ohio State Football because
he had been receiving extra benefits and lied to investigators about it. See Associated Press, supra note 43 (noting again suspension was unrelated to abilities on
football field or actions towards NFL). Prior to his lawsuit, newspapers had predicted that the action he brought against the NFL could be one of two options for
him, other option being transferring to another university. See id. (describing options presented to Clarett at time of his suspension).
44. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126 (explaining Clarett’s season-long suspension
led to him wanting to enter NFL, ultimately ended up with him bringing suit to
allow him to do so). However, the court pointed out that an NFL rule meant to
accommodate and encourage players to attend college before entering the league
which was in place since 1925 did not allow him to enter the NFL. See id. (describing good intentions of NFL in imposing rule dating back eighty years). The court
continued by explaining the history and reasoning behind the NFL’s rule and
noted that prior to 1990, the rule prohibited players from joining the league until
after college or four seasons, but in 1990 the NFL relaxed the rule and allowed
players to enter the draft after three full seasons following their high school graduation. See id. (observing despite relaxed rules, Clarett was still shy of
requirements).
45. See Haywood, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (pointing to Haywood’s cause of
action); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Conn. 1977) (pointing also
to Linseman’s cause of action); Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 1984) (continuing to point to common cause of action); Clarett, 369 F.3d
at 126 (discussing why, how these cases were brought). Having all been brought
under the same section of the Sherman Antitrust Act and for the same general
reason, it shows that there is a case history of age restriction issues throughout
professional sports. See Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205 (describing plaintiff’s action for
per se violation of Sherman Act); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. At 1317 (noting
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of the Sherman Antitrust Act.46 Under that section, any contract
that results in a restraint of trade or commerce is illegal.47 To bring
an action under Section 1, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that
the restriction imposed on them constitutes an unreasonable and
unlawful restraint of trade.48 In the sports context, players are
claiming that an organizations’ restrictions are unreasonably limiting their ability to compete in the marketplace of sports.49 When
considering a request for injunctive relief against an identified restriction, courts apply two different tests.50 Under these tests, there
must be a “clear showing of either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury or (2) sufficiently serious quesplaintiff’s allegation Defendant had violated Section 1 of Sherman Act); Boris, 1984
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, *1 (noting allegation of Section 1 violation); Clarett, 369
F.3d at 126 (also noting allegation of Section 1 violation).
46. For further discussion of the applicable cases, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
47. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (LexisNexis 2021) (pointing to the text of the statue);
see also PRACTICAL LAW ANTITRUST, SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT:
OVERVIEW (n.d.), Westlaw (declaring “every contract . . . in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States. . . is hereby declared to be illegal”). This
means that if a contract is entered between parties and it restrains some type of
trade or commerce then it is an illegal contract. See Practical Law Antitrust, supra
note 47 (explaining how Section 1 of Sherman Act applies). An example of general Section 1 restraint of trade is price fixing, bid rigging, and customer or market
allocation. See id. (identifying violations of Section 1).
48. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. At 1320 (explaining how plaintiff can prevail
under Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act). The three elements plaintiffs must
prove are (1) an agreement (2) which unreasonably retrains trade and (3) an effect on interstate commerce. See id. (noting elements court requires to be successful). At first glance, a professional sports team seems to operate in one city, but
because these team engage in games in different states and compete against different teams, they gain revenue I interstate commerce and, thus, fall under Section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Joe Barton, Interference!, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2009),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/12/why-is-congress-always-meddlingwith-sports.html [https://perma.cc/ATB9-VPRK] (commenting professional
sports are in fact part of interstate commerce, leaving door open for Congress to
regulate under Article I, Section 8 of United States Constitution).
49. See Carl W. Hettinger & Adam D. Brown, Antitrust Law Looms Over Sports
Contracts Analysis, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 14, 2011), https://www.post-gazette.com/business/legal/2011/02/14/Antitrust-law-looms-over-sports-contractsanalysis/stories/201102140219 [https://perma.cc/CJ8V-Y4V9] (discussing how
professional sports “engage in some conduct that is arguably fundamentally ‘anticompetitive’ ” against their athletes, which results in limits on their ability to compete within marketplace). Because of this nature of anti-competitive deals, Congress and the courts have created exemptions and exceptions to the Sherman Act
to avoid constant litigation in professional sports. See id. (noting these exemptions
or exceptions protect professional leagues but still regulate their conduct to be
consistent with free market principles Sherman Antitrust Act is based on).
50. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp at 1318 (explaining these two tests came from
Second Circuit in an effort to make decisions on preliminary injunctions standard); see also O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1068 (D. Ore. June 17, 2021) (explaining further test being applied as standard in this decision).
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tions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly towards the party requesting the preliminary relief.”51 Some courts include the additional requirement of showing irreparable injury and probable
success, also known as balancing the equities.52 If the plaintiff satisfies the applicable test, then the court grants their preliminary injunction.53 A Section 1 claim is the most common way for an
athlete to bring suit against a league for something they deem an
unfair restriction.54 However, no Section 1 claim has yet crossed
over or interacted with the FLSA Child Labor Provision.55
B. A Whole New World
The FLSA was enacted in 1938 as a way for Congress to stabilize the economy and protect the nation’s labor force.56 After many
51. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. At 1318 (explaining court can grant preliminary injunction if plaintiff can show both factors) (quoting Sonesta Intern. Hotels
Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 438 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973).
52. See Heldman v. U.S. Lawn Tennis Ass’n., 354 F. Supp. 1241, 1249–50
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting some courts require third factor to be shown to grant
injunction). This third factor requires that the plaintiff must show that acquiring
the injunction is “so important to them as to outbalance any inconvenience to be
suffered by the defendants.” See id. (explaining by adding third factor, courts take
equity approach in decision in granting injunction).
53. See id. (explaining if court concludes plaintiff satisfies factors, court must
“balance the equities”—if balance tips in favor of plaintiff, preliminary injunction
should be granted).
54. For further discussion of examples of claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see supra notes 32–44 and accompanying text.
55. See generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 212 (LexisNexis 2021) (commenting on child
labor provision of FLSA’s lack of connection to Sherman Antitrust Act); see also
O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1073 (noting NWSL made argument allowing minors to
play would require extra resources by them to comply with laws, which alludes to
fact courts have not yet established how leagues or teams should comply—thus
requiring extra resources by them). This is likely because when an athlete brings
suit under Section 1, it is not because of child labor issue but constraint of trade
issue. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. At 1317 (describing Linseman claim was brought
due to constraint of trade, but Linseman was over 18).
56. See Ann K. Wooster, Validity, Construction, and Application of Fair Labor Standards Act – Supreme Court Cases, 196 A.L.R. Fed. 507, *2a (2004) (explaining backdrop of FLSA); see also Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), LIVING NEW DEAL (Nov. 18,
2016), https://livingnewdeal.org/glossary/fair-labor-standards-act-1938 [https://
perma.cc/Y9EE-D6MQ] (explaining Congress enacted FLSA to help post-Great
Depression, still-struggling America). Congress intended the Act to stabilize the
economy and protect the common labor force of those who were “engaged in” or
“in the production of goods for” interstate and foreign commerce. See Wooster,
supra note 56 (explaining prior to FLSA, there had never been extensive labor
protection law enacted anywhere in world). Enacted during the New Deal era by
President Roosevelt, the FLSA created the Wage and Hour Division in the Department of Labor with the sole purpose of carrying out and creating regulations in
accordance with FLSA’s provisions. See id. (noting department is still operating
today as enforcer of FLSA).
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failed attempts, President Roosevelt was finally able to muster a
large majority of Congress to pass the FLSA.57 At the time of the
enactment during the post-Great Depression period, wages were
low and businesses took advantage of workers.58 The Act set a minimum wage floor, prevented and regulated child labor, and ensured
overtime pay for employees.59 Congress wanted to provide individual workers with the minimum protections that would ensure employees would receive “[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” and
further that employees would be protected from “the evil of ‘overwork’ as well as ‘underpay.’”60
In addition to the quest of ensuring fair and proper compensation of employees, the fight to prevent and regulate child labor began.61 Section 212 of the FLSA provides an outline that prohibits
oppressive child labor by any employer taking part in the production of goods for commerce.62 Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulation further imposed regulations concerning the employment of
minors under the age of sixteen.63 Specifically, the Section provides that a minors age fourteen or fifteen may not work (1) more
57. See Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle
For a Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/flsa1938 [https://perma.cc/FR2B-U47Y] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022)
(discussing history of struggle that led to Congress passing FLSA).
58. See id. (explaining FLSA was humanitarian measure, provided elaborate
scheme for minimum wages, overtime pay).
59. See Catherine Ruckelshaus, Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: It’s More Important Than Ever, NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT (June 26, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/
commentary/fair-labor-standards-act-at-80-its-more-important-than-ever/#:
~:text=Congress%20enacted%20the%20FLSA%20to,method%20of%20competition%E2%80%9D%20against%20reputable [https://perma.cc/Y95D-5EXX] (discussing importance of FLSA while emphasizing original intentions of FLSA in
workforce). Congress enacted the FLSA to ensure that labor standards were high
enough to ensure that workers could meet the minimum standard of living necessary for the general wellbeing of workers and their families. See id. (noting purpose behind FLSA was to promote general well-being of people).
60. See Barrentine v. Ark. Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)
(quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 588 (1942)) (explaining what FLSA was designed to do for American workers); see also Ruckelshaus, supra note 59 (discussing FLSA sought to give minimum protections to
individual workers and offer protection from excessive overworking without proportional compensation).
61. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 59 (noting while FLSA’s overall goal was to
ensure proper treatment of employees, government also sought to eliminate oppressive child labor to set standards for treating children).
62. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 212I (LexisNexis 2021) (“No employer shall employ any
oppressive child labor in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
or in any enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce.”).
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35 (2010) (stating restrictive hours requirement for
minors ages fourteen or fifteen).
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than forty hours in any one week when school is not in session, (2)
more than eighteen hours in any one week when school is in session, (3) more than eight hours in any one day when school is not
in session, (4) more than three hours in any one day when school is
in session, including Fridays, (5) between 7 A.M. and 7 P.M. in any
one day except during the summer when the evening hour will be 9
P.M.64 Additionally, Section 213 provides for exemptions to the
child labor provisions.65 One of those exemptions states that the
Section 212 does not apply to “any child employed as an actor or
performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio
or television productions.”66 In the years following FLSA’s enactment, most forms of oppressive child labor ended and disappeared.67 However, the amount of children under eighteen
employed in the United States has grown drastically.68 Since 2001,

64. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35(a) (2010) (detailing specific number of hours minors fourteen or fifteen years of age can work during specific times of year). The
minor’s hour limitations vary depending on if it is during the school year or not.
See id. (commenting statute changes requirements depending on time of year,
noting summer is considered June 1st through Labor Day).
65. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 213I-(d) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing FLSA’s exemption
for child labor provision). The exemptions include those employed (1) in agriculture outside of school hours which is not hazardous, (2) as child actors or performers in motion pictures, theatrical, radio or television, and (3) as newspaper delivery
workers. See id. (listing exemptions to FLSA child labor provisions).
66. See id. § 213I(3) (identifying child actor exception to Section 212); see also
History.com Editors, Hollywood, A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS, L.L.C. (Aug. 21,
2018), https://www.history.com/topics/roaring-twenties/hollywood [https://
perma.cc/V22H-BQLF] (stating child actors or performers are excluded from
FLSA child labor provision). A reasonable explanation for this exemption is that
when the FLSA was enacted in 1938, the economy was recovering and the entertainment industry was beginning to boom. See John Farr, How Movies Got Us
Through The Great Depression, BEST MOVIES BY FARR (June 12, 2015), https://
www.bestmoviesbyfarr.com/articles/movies-from-the-great-depression/2015/06
[https://perma.cc/5Z3Z-3P96] (noting throughout 1930s, movie industry was at
its peak).
67. See Jenna Merten, Raising A Red Card: Why Freddy Adu Should Not Be Allowed
To Play Professional Soccer, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 206 (2004) (discussing
FLSA as successful in eradicating oppressive child labor from American society).
However, the article points out that because of the recent rise in children who are
employed, the United States government has been unable to effectively enforce
FLSA child labor guidelines, which has led to more violations. See id. at 206 (adding 4% of sixteen-year-old males had been employed in 1940 but in 1980, 44% of
sixteen-year-old males were employed); see also Youth Employment, CHILD TRENDS
(May 27, 2019), https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/youth-employment
[https://perma.cc/Z5YE-X9GM] (noting near 50% rise in child employment).
68. See Merten, supra note 67, at 206 (identifying only 4% of sixteen-year-old
boys in 1940 were employed but 44% of same group were employed in 1980); see
also Youth Employment, supra note 67 (indicating as of 2018, 50% of children were
employed).
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30% of children between the ages of fifteen to seventeen are typically employed.69
The FLSA is a federal law and therefore applies to all states;
however, states are free to add in their own restrictions provided
they comport with federal law.70 As a result, many States have added their own provisions that generally enhance the restrictions imposed within that state’s boundaries.71 In Oregon, where O.M.
signed to play professional soccer, the state adopted the FLSA’s
child labor provision in full, but added a few more requirements.72
Specifically, Oregon further requires that there be (1) meal and
rest periods, (2) jobs that minors are excluded from performing,
(3) jobs that are excluded from these regulations, and (4) forms
that non-agricultural, agriculture, and entertainment employers
must fill out.73 While Oregon law does not differ greatly from federal law, employers from states like Oregon need to ensure compliance with both federal and state law.74
C. Never Say Never: Expanding the Law
Professional child athletes are nothing new in the field of individual sports, but those sports are hard to regulate without the presence of an employer such as a professional team.75 For example,
there has been a thirteen year-old professional golfer and a fifteen69. See Merten, supra note 67, at 206 (noting large number of employed children, while not like pre-FLSA time, has resulted in increase of child labor violations); see also Chris Kolmar, High School Job Statistics 2022, ZIPPIA (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://www.zippia.com/advice/high-school-job-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/
BX8P-6JEL] (noting percentage of teens employed remains around 30%).
70. See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 (establishing federal law’s precedence over state
laws in Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution). Since Section 212 of the
FLSA is a federal regulation, it takes precedence over state law. See 29 U.S.C.S.
§ 212 (LexisNexis 2021) (laying out federal requirements, including standards for
child labor).
71. See id. (discussing although federal law takes precedence over state laws,
States can enhance federal law in their own state by adding onto regulations or
adopting own laws).
72. See Minor Workers, OR. BUREAU OF LAB. & INDUS., https://www.oregon.gov/
boli/employers/pages/minor-workers.aspx#:~:text=there%20are
%20no%20limits%20on,hours%20on%20non%2Dschool%20days [https://
perma.cc/3ULM-J72R] (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) (noting Oregon legislature, state
in which professional team O.M. is playing on is located, has adopted FLSA child
labor provisions with additional restrictions, making it stricter than FLSA).
73. See id. (describing further restrictions Oregon requires in Section 570.35,
enhancing Department of Labor’s restrictions).
74. See id. (identifying Oregon’s added restrictions and how employers must
be careful about ensuring compliance when operating in Oregon).
75. See Merten, supra note 67, at 206 (discussing young athletes in individual
sports who have risen in ranks of professional sports).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss2/6

12

McCann: Is Age Just a Number: The Intersection of the Fair Labor Standard

2022]

AGE

IS

JUST A NUMBER

405

year-old professional gymnast in individual sports.76 In 2004,
Freddy Adu, a fourteen-year-old, signed a six-year contract with Major League Soccer, making him the youngest professional athlete in
American team sports.77
In both New York and California, state legislatures have passed
statutes regarding child entertainers and athletes.78 California was
the first state to enact its legislation and New York quickly followed
with its own.79 Both of these laws are concerned with the child’s
ability to enter into a contract as an entertainer or athlete, and both
elaborate on the FLSA’s entertainer exemption.80 In both instances, the state statutes require judicial approval of the contracts.81 However, even with these laws, there is no legislation
outside of the FLSA that strictly regulates how many hours child
athletes can train on their own outside of school attendance policies.82 But it is promising that professional minor athletes of pro76. See id. (stating Michelle Wie entered Women’s Professional Golf Championship at thirteen years old, Carly Patterson won gold medal in Olympics at fifteen
years old).
77. See id. (commenting on Freddy Adu, who was youngest professional athlete in over one hundred years on team sport within United States).
78. See Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & John H. Shannon, Principles of Contract Law
Applied To Entertainment and Sports Contracts: A Model For Balancing the Rights of the
Industry With Protecting the Interests of Minors, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2015)
(discussing legislation New York, California have passed regarding child athletes to
account for what FLSA (as enforced by Department of Labor) neglected to cover).
79. See id. (discussing how California’s law was model for New York law); see
also Coogan Law, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD – AM. FED. OF TELEVISION AND RADIO ARTISTS, https://www.sagaftra.org/membership-benefits/young-performers/cooganlaw [https://perma.cc/9MGZ-NSDM] (last visited Jan. 8, 2022) (reporting New
York enacted law similar to California’s “Coogan’s Law”). “Coogan’s Law” was enacted in 1939 and named after a child actor, Jackie Coogan. See SAG AFTRA,
www.sagaftra.org, (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) (explaining Coogan was cast in Charlie Chaplin’s famous film, The Kid, was then instant star who quickly made
money). After his father died, Coogan came to find out that his father did not save
any of his earnings for him and he eventually sued his mother. See id. (noting
cause of action resulting in “Coogan’s Law”). New York took “Coogan’s Law” as a
model for their legislation of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law. See
Hunter, supra note 78, at 1188 (explaining further what New York modeled law
after).
80. See Hunter, supra note 78, at 1187 (noting New York, California each enacted legislation regarding child professional athletes in addition to child actor
exemptions because legislators saw need for it—most importantly legislators saw
need to ensure children were not being taken advantage of in contracts or by
parents).
81. See id. (identifying how in both New York legislature, California legislature decided best course of action to protect child athletes was by requiring judicial imprimatur).
82. See Erica Siegel, When Parental Interference Goes Too Far: The Need For Adequate Protection Of Child Entertainers And Athletes, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427,
462 (2000) (discussing there is little way to regulate parents of children in en-
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fessional team sports will enjoy more well-regulated schedules as
opposed to the schedules of individual sports because the minor
becomes an employee of the team.83
The most recent case brought to the courts regarding an age
restriction in professional sports is O.M. v. National Women’s Soccer
League.84 Here, the plaintiff, O.M., was a fifteen-year-old seeking an
injunction against the NWSL barring it from enforcing their Age
Rule that all players be at least eighteen years-old to play in the
league.85 Previously, the court granted a temporary restraining order which prohibited the NWSL from enforcing the rule.86 O.M.
brought this action under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
and argued that the NWSL’s teams have agreed among themselves
that the League will not contract players under the age of eighteen
regardless of their talent or ability to compete.87 She made it clear
that she was not seeking an order requiring a team to hire her, but
was only seeking to fight and compete with others for a position on
tertainment or sports industries, but longest-standing laws regulating children’s
work hours use mandatory school attendance policies).
83. For further discussion of how courts disregarded the employer-employee
relationship in team sports, see infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text.
84. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2021) (noting case is most
recent to attract judicial consideration regarding age restrictions in professional
sports).
85. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (providing background on O.M. including role in suit). In more detail, O.M. is fifteen-year-old soccer player who sued
the NWSL hoping to be granted an injunction to prevent the League from enforcing their rule that requires all players in the League to be at least eighteen years
old, otherwise known as the “Age Rule.” See id. (noting background of case). Previously, the court had granted O.M.’s request for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and this cause was brought for permanent one. See id. (noting previous
court actions taken in case).
86. See id. (noting court granted temporary restraining order pending final
consideration of request for injunctive relief).
87. See id. (noting age agreement among teams was not result of collective
bargaining, therefore O.M. not barred from court under Section 1 claim); see also
Opening Br. for Nat’l Women’s Soccer League, LLC at 1, O.M., 554 F. Supp. 3d.
1063 (D. Ore. June 17, 2021) (noting O.M. argued Age Rule served “no legitimate
business justification or procompetitive purpose” and Age Rule violates Sherman
Antitrust Act). However, in the NWSL’s brief to the court, the League argued that
there are numerous legal and practical concerns about imposing the age restriction on minors to limit their participation in professional sports such as “(1) state
child labor laws, (2) minors’ ability to avoid employment contracts, (3) physical
and athletic development of minors, and (4) concerns addressed in the Safe Sport
Act.” See Opening Br. for Nat’l Women’s Soccer League, LLC at 6, supra note 87
(explaining NWSL’s concerns presented to court). Lastly, the League argued that
an age restriction was consistent practice among other professional sports leagues
and therefore constituting a legitimate business purpose. See id. (continuing to
explain NWSL’s argument).
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one of the teams.88 O.M. argued that keeping her out of the league
“will continually slow her development, delay her improvement,
and more generally impede her career as a soccer player.”89 After
going through an extensive analysis, the court ruled in O.M.’s favor
because she was able to show that enforcing the Age Rule would
cause her irreparable harm.90 The court applied previous standards to determine if O.M. was entitled to a preliminary injunction.91 The court found that the merits clearly favored O.M., that
she would be irreparably harmed if not granted the preliminary injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest
strongly favored providing her this opportunity.92 The court also
found that the NWSL was unable to provide a compelling procompetitive reason to justify an anticompetitive policy such as this Age
Rule.93 As a result, she met her burden of establishing that a preliminary injunction could be granted.94 O.M. was able to sign with

88. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (explaining O.M. is suing for opportunity to enter League rather than requiring NWSL to accept her on one of teams).
89. See id. (discussing background leading up to O.M.’s action including how
she will suffer harm if court does not grant injunction).
90. See id. at 1076 (discussing O.M. has shown she will suffer irreparable injury
without Court granting the injunction.). Specifically, O.M. has proven that the
Age Rule is “impeding her development as a soccer player” and that careers in
professional soccer are short and there is no substitute to help her “realize her full
potential.” See id. (discussion of argument made by O.M., which court found
credible).
91. For further discussion of the elements courts consider for a preliminary
injunction, see supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
92. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (noting one of O.M.’s arguments was
that MLS did not impose age restriction on men, therefore, because NWSL was
only league available to her, it was unfair that boy of O.M.’s age would be able to
compete but O.M. could not). The court addressed this argument when they said
that the balancing of equities and public interest fell strongly in O.M.’s favor because it would be unfair that a boy was able to pursue the same opportunity in
men’s Major League Soccer but not in the National Women’s Soccer League. See
id. (explaining court’s reasoning behind finding in favor of O.M.).
93. For further discussion of the NWSL’s failure to produce compelling evidence justifying the policy, see supra note 87 and accompanying text. Particularly,
the NWSL’s argument failed to justify why their policy would not be anticompetitive and presented the court with little to no evidence of a non-anticompetitive
reason. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1076 (finding court decided none of numerous legal or practical concerns presented by NWSL in opening brief were enough
to prove Age Rule was sufficient to justify having inherently anticompetitive
policy).
94. See id. (noting O.M. pleaded case sufficiently, so court granted relief
sought). However, this injunction is only temporary until a final trial in the coming months. See id. (noting decision made by court was only for temporary injunction, with further court date set to decide on permanent injunction).
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the Portland Thorns and begin her professional career at age
fifteen.95
III. KICKING

AND

RUNNING TO CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS ON CHILD
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon’s
opinion in O.M. opened the flood gates to questions on how to
handle child labor laws in professional sports.96 While it is only a
preliminary injunction and the case will be decided at trial on the
merits at a later date, the court stated that the merits clearly favor
O.M.’s position.97 In their counter-argument, the NWSL claimed
that by limiting their employment to a certain age, the league was
avoiding unnecessary wastes of time and resources required to comply with child labor laws.98 The court quickly dismissed the NWLS’s
argument and did not address their concern on minor safety, but
continued to focus on the standards for an antitrust claim.99 Section III will argue that unlike Sherman Antitrust Act violations, the
courts neglected to acknowledge and address the implications of
allowing minors to be employed by professional sport organizations.100 Additionally, Section III further explores the impact FLSA
restrictions will have on day-to-day operations and schedules of professional sport teams and will present examples of how teams could
be affected.101 The court’s dismissal of the NWSL’s concern for minor safety laws and compliance will be addressed in the remainder
of this Comment.102
95. See Portland Thorns’ Olivia Moultrie, 15, Becomes Youngest NWSL Player Ever,
ESPN (June 30, 2021), https://www.espn.com/soccer/portland-thorns-fc/story/
4424066/portland-thorns-olivia-moultrie15signs-deal-to-become-youngest-nwslplayer [https://perma.cc/QC5E-M8CS] (noting O.M. signed three-year deal with
Portland Thorns as youngest player ever to sign with National Women’s Soccer
League team).
96. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1076 (noting Court granted injunction to
allow O.M. to play in NWSL as minor, so result of this decision will likely lead to
other minors bringing similar claims against other team sports leagues).
97. See id. at 1067 (noting merits clearly favor O.M.).
98. See id. at 1073–74 (discussing how League argued limiting employment to
players of certain age would avoid “significant time and resources” needed to comply with child labor labors).
99. See id. (discussing how League failed to show how much it would cost to
have minor on team).
100. For further discussion of the implications of minors being employed by
professional sports, see infra notes 129–163 and accompanying text.
101. For further discussion of the implications of the FLSA on sports, see infra
notes 140–154 and accompanying text.
102. For further discussion of how the court did not acknowledge any of the
NWSL’s arguments regarding the difficulties of compliance with child labor laws,
see infra notes 108–189 and accompanying text. .
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The repercussions of applying the FLSA to professional sport
organizations has yet to be seen due in part to a minor never having
entered a team sport before.103 As previously stated, prior cases
brought to the court all began with the same argument that the
restriction in place caused a restraint of trade issue and ultimately a
Section 1 Sherman Act violation.104 However, while the same argument applies to O.M. a different element comes into play – age,
which implicates additional mandates on the teams.105 The FLSA
requires teams to comply with state and federal laws if they are going to employ an athlete who is under the age of sixteen.106 The
impact of the FLSA is not a minor one and will affect all facets of
the operations in professional organizations.107
A. Game, Set, Match: Young Athletes Win in the Courts
All previous cases where athletes brought claims against professional sports leagues involved alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.108 However, the big difference between those cases and
O.M. is that those cases involved players who were over the age of
sixteen years old.109 Therefore, the assumption in those cases was
that the FLSA would not have applied to these players because of
their age.110 In Haywood,111 the Supreme Court found that the
NBA is not exempt from antitrust laws and, in view of the equities
103. For further discussion of applying the FLSA to professional sports, see
infra notes 108–179 and accompanying text.
104. For further discussion of how previous cases were brought against professional leagues, see supra notes 32 – 55 and accompanying text.
105. For further discussion of prior case results, see infra notes 108–128 and
accompanying text.
106. For further discussion of FLSA implications, see infra notes 129–163 and
accompanying text.
107. For further discussion of the impact of the FLSA, see infra notes 164–180
and accompanying text.
108. For further discussion of the legal action behind previous athlete lawsuits against their respective leagues, see supra notes 33–54.
109. See Haywood, 401 U.S. 1204-05 (1971) (noting that Haywood had been
just shy of the four year post high school requirement and was twenty-one-yearsold); see also Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (noting that Linseman
was nineteen-years-old); Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
1984) (noting Boris was in his third year of college making him between twenty
and twenty-one-years-old); Clarett, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting primary
difference between previous cases versus O.M.’s case was age).
110. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.37 (2022) (noting because these athletes were not
under age of sixteen, question of what happens when athlete is that young never
arose before). However, the government had already issued regulations on how
employees under the age of sixteen would be affected differently. See id. (explaining regulations are in place to direct employers on steps to take with minor
employees).
111. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
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between the parties, the Court granted Haywood’s preliminary injunction.112 This was the Supreme Court’s first decision considering whether the NBA was exempt from antitrust laws.113 This
decision was monumental because the last time the Court had addressed the topic was when it held that Major League Baseball was
exempt from antitrust laws.114
Following Haywood, the Linseman115 court agreed and came to
the same conclusion when it held the WHA accountable for breaking antitrust laws by requiring its players to be at least twenty years
old.116 Specifically, the court found that the rule constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.117 Similarly, both Boris118 and
Clarett119 found in the players’ favor.120 In Boris, the court adopted
reasoning similar to Haywood and stated that requiring a player to
compete in college before entering the draft constituted an illegal
group boycott of amateur players and violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.121 In Clarett, the court had originally decided for the plaintiff, but on appeal the court found that the nonstatutory labor exemption immunized the challenged rules from
112. See id. at 1205–06 (discussing previous case law allowed for there to be
exemption to Sherman Antitrust Act for Major League Baseball). However, the
court in Haywood decided that the exemption would not apply to the National
Basketball Association and therefore Haywood was entitled to relief. See id. (noting
significant decision made by court in this case, resulting in professional leagues,
other than MLB, being subject to Sherman Antitrust Act).
113. See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball, 259 U.S.
200, 208 (1992) (deciding baseball was “purely state” affair, so it was exempt from
antitrust laws). However, the Supreme Court had not mentioned or decided this
same outcome for any other professional sports leagues. See id. (noting court only
addressed baseball, not any other sport).
114. See id. (noting baseball was exempt from antitrust laws, but courts had
not carried this exemption over to any other sports).
115. Linseman v. World Hockey Assoc., 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
116. See Linseman, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1325–26 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding arguments presented by WHA were no different than those present in Haywood,
then finding balance of equities favored plaintiff).
117. See id. (explaining court conclusion WHA Age Rule violated Section 1 of
Sherman Antitrust Act by resulting an unreasonable restraint of trade).
118. Boris v. United States Football League, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
119. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
120. See Boris, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19061, at *8 (noting court found United
States Football League’s rule violated Section 1 of Sherman Act, so it was a restraint of trade); see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125 (deciding both “eligibility rules”
are in violation of Sherman Act).
121. See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the
NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RSVR. L. REV. 731, 739 (2006) (discussing how Boris
court found requiring players to complete college before entering draft violated
Sherman Antitrust Act).
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antitrust laws.122 Clarett’s case is an example of how collective bargaining can exempt a league from liability under antitrust laws.123
However, it is key to point out that while some of these restrictions
correlated with a given number of years out of high school or in
college, there is ultimately another way to implicate an age restriction.124 Despite those facts, none of these previous cases, including
O.M., tackled the issue of the FLSA and its child labor provision.125
Furthermore, in Freddy Adu’s case, Major League Soccer
(“MLS”) did not have any age restrictions in place when he signed
his professional contract.126 This area of law has remained untouched by both courts and a majority of states.127 Even with the
attempts by New York and California, the topic of work hours and
schedules under the FLSA has evaded judicial or legislative
scrutiny.128
B. Learning the Rules of the Game
Professional sports inherently participate in and benefit from
interstate commerce.129 Between games in different states and merchandise sales throughout the country, professional sports, particularly the NWSL, clearly engage in interstate commerce.130
Therefore, through their participation in interstate commerce, the
FLSA binds the NWSL and its teams.131 The sole exception is when
collective bargaining among the league, players, and teams pro122. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129 (noting there was immunity from antitrust
scrutiny because collective bargaining agreement brought about restriction).
123. See id. (noting Clarett lost his case because League had preexisting collective bargaining agreement, which barred him from entering league due to draft
eligibility rules).
124. For further discussion of how courts treated restrictions tied to age differently depending on the minor’s age, see supra notes 112–120 and accompanying text.
125. For further discussion of what issues were brought before the courts in
previous cases, see supra notes 32–44 and 84–95 and accompanying text.
126. See Jenna Merten, supra note 67, at 217 (noting solution to question
posed about Freddy Adu’s age would be to implement minimum age requirement
for MLS because there currently is not one).
127. For further discussion of Freddy Adu and his professional career as a
minor, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
128. For further discussion of the attempts to incorporate child professional
athletes in the law, see supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
129. See generally 29 U.S.C.S. § 212(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (noting FLSA applies
to those who take part in interstate commerce).
130. See id. (noting FLSA’s definition of who law applies to).
131. See id. (noting because League, teams are generally across state lines,
they take part in interstate commerce).
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duces any rules.132 However, this exception does not apply to children under the age of sixteen, who are subject to extensive
restrictions for employment.133 Consequently, the professional
sports world did not contemplate employing minors when Congress
passed the FLSA or when courts created the collective bargaining
exemption.134 Additionally, courts did not address the employment
of children in professional sports under the FLSA or antitrust provisions.135 As a result, the guidance on minors employed as professional athletes is scarce.136
Section 213 of the FLSA created exemptions to the child labor
provisions and particularly excluded child actors and performers.137 However, while some professional leagues might argue that
athletes under the age of sixteen are performers, the exemption
specifies that the exempted children are those “in motion pictures
or theatrical productions” which does not include athletes.138 Unless otherwise provided by individual states, federal law does not
exempt minor athletes.139
The FLSA’s restrictions do not necessarily affect the minor athlete as much as they affects the teams.140 With restrictive work
hours, teams will need to configure their schedules around the minor’s workable hours.141 This will result in limited timeframes to
hold practice, games, and other events that require their participa132. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1074 (D. Or. 2021) (noting long standing holding that collective bargaining agreements are exempt from scrutiny under
Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
133. For further discussion of why collective bargaining agreements cannot
impose restrictions that conflict with child labor law provisions, see supra notes
63–64.
134. See Merten, supra note 67 (explaining what prompted United States to
enact FLSA).
135. For further discussion of how previous child professional athletes remained unaffected by the FLSA, see supra notes 75–83.
136. See 29 C.F.R. 570.37 (2010) (noting absence of guidance in this area,
including lack of legislation).
137. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 213 (LexisNexis 2021) (discussing when FLSA was enacted in 1938, Congress promised to include exemptions to child labor provision,
specifically so child actors, child performers would not need to comply fully with
provision).
138. See id. § 213(c)(3) (noting it would be impossible to interpret as exemption for minor athletes because exemption specifically states who it applies to, does
not leave room to interpret as including more professions).
139. For further discussion of New York and California’s attempt to exempt
child athletes from child labor laws, see supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
140. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35(a) (2010) (explaining children under age of sixteen cannot work during certain times).
141. See id. (requiring minors under age of sixteen have restricted work
hours).
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tion.142 Except where otherwise specified by federal or state law,
professional sports teams with minors under the age of sixteen are
required to accept that the minors might be unable to participate
in practice, games, or events that are considered part of their job
during restrictive hours.143 The most noticeable implication may
be the start times of games.144 For example, if a typical game is
scheduled to start at 8 P.M., the minor cannot participate in the
game after 9 P.M.145 This would result in the team either starting
games earlier in order to be finished by 9 P.M. or taking the minor
off after that time.146 This will also cause teams who do not employ
minors on their individual team to have to ensure compliance with
game times.147 While this fine detail seems easy to fix, it would require the League and teams to completely reschedule games,
rebook vendors, re-plan entire gameday schedules, and coordinate
with each other on a large scale.148
Another major issue that the teams will run into if minors can
play is formulating practice and event schedules.149 Under Section
570.35 of the FLSA, a minor under sixteen years old cannot work
more than eight hours in one day when school is not in session or
three hours in one day when school is in session.150 This would
mean that a minor, like O.M., would be unable to practice or attend working events more than three hours per day while in
142. See id. §570.35(c)(2) (noting time restrictions on work hours of minors
will affect many aspects of how professional sports operate their schedules).
143. See id. (noting further how these restrictions will affect teams).
144. See id. §570.35(a) (noting 29 C.F.R. Section 570.35 requires minors not
work between certain hours).
145. For further discussion of the time restrictions under 29 C.F.R. Section
570.35 and how this example (while seeming small) can cause a large impact, see
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
146. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35(c) (2010) (providing example of how regulation
would apply in real practice towards professional team regarding game times).
147. See id. (providing example of how regulation affecting teams employing
minors will also affect teams who compete against minors). This implication further reaches outside of compliance for just one organization to another. See 29
U.S.C.S. § 212(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (noting child labor provisions prohibit businesses from partaking in commerce with businesses who have oppressive child labor, therefore businesses must also be in compliance with child labor regulations
set forth by Department of Labor).
148. See 2021 Schedule, N A T ’ L W O M E N ’ S S O C C E R L E A G U E , https://
www.nwslsoccer.com/schedule?season=2021 [https://perma.cc/9ME6-K4YA] (last
visited March 9, 2022) (displaying 2021 schedule for all teams in NWSL, noting
many games do not begin until 7:30 or 8:00 P.M.).
149. For further discussion of the time restrictions imposed on minors that
will affect day to day operations, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
150. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35(a)(4), (5) (2010) (noting restriction on work
hours per day).
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school.151 Particularly, from Labor Day to Memorial Day, the minor could only practice, participate in meetings, or engage in any
other activity relating to their employment with the team for three
hours each day during the week.152 These restrictions would deeply
impact when a team chooses to practice or schedules nonpractice
events.153 This could cause the teams to limit nonpractice events to
weekends only or to choose between requiring the minor’s attendance at a practice or nonpractice event.154
Even with recent situations in individual sports, such as tennis
with players as young as thirteen years old entering the professional
ranks, most states have not addressed the age issue.155 Not only are
individual sports hard to regulate, there is no identifiable “employer” as with team sports.156 One of the few exceptions due to
additional state requirements, in addition to California and New
York, is Washington D.C., requires any minor who wants to enter
professional sports to have their parent or guardian apply for a permit from the Board of Education.157 For example, if O.M. lived in
151. See id. (offering how hours regulation would practically affect O.M. in
day-to-day training including work duties as employee of Portland Thorns).
152. See id. (providing example of type of employment activities minor athletes will end up being restricted to choose from).
153. See id. (providing additional information to further enhance example
provided with details of how effect will take place).
154. See id. (noting generally these implications are highly relevant under
these restrictions).
155. See Ryan Rodenberg, Age Eligibility Rules in Women’s Professional Tennis:
Necessary for the Integrity, Viability, and Administration of the Game or an Unreasonable
Restraint of Trade in Violation of Antitrust Law, 7 SPORTS LAW J. 183, 185–86 (2000)
(commenting on lack of interest in addressing FLSA implications on thirteen-yearold professional tennis player); see also Merten, supra note 67, at 206–07 (noting
players in individual sports such as tennis, work as independent contractors, so
have not been subject to antitrust litigation, nor have most states enacted laws
regarding child professional athletes).
156. See Rodenberg, supra note 67, at 185–86 (noting major difference between team sports versus individual sports is employer aspect). In individual sports
such as tennis or golf, athletes are self-employed and only interact with the league
for competition, but their schedules and practice largely remain in their hands.
See id. (noting difficultly of league to regulate or keep up with individual players).
In contrast, in team sports, the athletes are not independent contractors but rather
employees of the team. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d. 1063, 1076 (D. Or. 2021) (noting reference of “employee,” “employer” used by court in team sport setting). This
difference between “independent contractor” and “employee” is where regulation
of child labor diverges. See Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited March 13, 2022), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
whd/flsa/misclassification [https://perma.cc/2Q87-Q83E] (speaking to the importance in identifying whether someone is an independent contractor or employee and the implications for both).
157. See Merten, supra note 67, at 208 (explaining Board of Education requires minors have “adequate provisions in education, safeguards for their health,
and proper supervision” meaning in some cases, employers need to provide neces-
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Washington D.C., she would be able to obtain a permit from the
Board of Education in order to except her and the team from the
FLSA’ strict requirements.158 Players can easily bring action under
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and seek injunctions to prevent enforcement of age or eligibility restrictions, provided that collective bargaining agreements did not produce the rule.159 This is a
win for athletes who want to start their professional careers, but it
creates a fine line to walk on for teams.160 This fine line will require teams and even leagues to navigate the restrictions regarding
minors.161 This will pose a challenge for teams and leagues because
a majority of professional sports seasons, particularly the NWSL’s,
take place during the school year.162 However, with time adjustments and well-thought-out planning, it should not be incredibly
difficult for leagues and teams to maintain compliance with the
FLSA’s requirements.163
C. Teamwork Makes The Dream Work: Planning for Child
Athletes
The impact is simple—professional teams will feel the effect of
contracting with younger players in their everyday schedules.164
Courts, states, leagues, and teams have avoided considering the insary supplies, minors cannot work in two live performances in one day, or more in
one week).
158. See id. (providing example where D.C. law would apply to minor who
entered professional sports league, explaining how minor would avoid tough FLSA
restrictions because of exemption in D.C.).
159. See id. at 220 (noting how easy is it for players to win lawsuit under Sherman Antitrust Act to remove age requirements).
160. For further discussion of how athletes were able to prevail and begin
their careers as minors, see supra notes 108–128 and accompanying text.
161. For further discussion of the specific requirements under the child labor
laws relating to time of day a minor can play, see supra notes 129–154 and accompanying text.
162. See Sandra Herrera, NWSL 2021 Schedule, Key Dates and Things to Know:
Challenge Cup Set for April Before 24-Game Season, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 8, 2021), https:/
/www.cbssports.com/soccer/news/nwsl-2021-schedule-key-dates-and-things-toknow-challenge-cup-set-for-april-before-24-game-season/ [https://perma.cc/S7U9UQNY] (discussing timeline for NWSL season—which begins May 15th and finishes up October 30th—would mean for half of season teams need to comply with
further restricted hours for minor players). Players report to camp beginning February 1st, requiring that teams comply with FLSA standards for the duration of
camp. See id. (noting beginning of timeframe for which teams will need to be in
compliance with FLSA).
163. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.35 (2010) (noting restrictions leagues, teams would
need to comply with).
164. For further discussion of specific restrictions causing professional
leagues to change routines, schedules, and timing for minor employees, see supra
notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
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tersection of the FLSA and professional sports for years, but since
the O.M. decision gained much attention, those groups may need
to start exploring the crossover.165 In the coming years, unless a
collective bargaining agreement is implemented, it is likely there
will be minors signing contracts in the NWSL.166 The Portland
Thorns, who signed O.M., submitted a compliance plan alongside
their contract for O.M. to ensure her a safe work space.167 A step
like this will soon become common practice if players continue to
become younger and younger, as fears of violating the FLSA and
similarly applicable state regulations will increase.168 It is unclear
what their compliance plan consisted of, but such a plan might be
considered commonplace if athletes under sixteen become the
norm.169 A compliance plan such as O.M.’s would likely include
FLSA compliance, including consideration of state child labor provisions for every state they play games in.170 Particularly, teams
should be expected to explain how they will make schedules that
comply with restricted hours.171 Teams would also need to discuss
whether minor athletes will operate on the same schedule as the
unrestricted players, and, if they do so, what the likely result would
be.172 Furthermore, teams should be prepared to lay out a schedule to provide proof of hours for the minors and possibly have the
165. For further discussion of how the decision in O.M. brought attention to
the FLSA, see supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
166. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2021) (noting O.M. recognized if Player’s Association, NWSL enter into collective bargaining agreement on
an age rule, she could lose her ability to play, but until then, there is no age rule).
167. See Jeff Kassouf, Olivia Moultrie Wins Preliminary Injunction Against NWSL’s
Age Rule, EQUALIZER (June 18, 2021), https://equalizersoccer.com/2021/06/18/
olivia-moultrie-wins-preliminary-injunction-against-nwsls-age-rule/ [https://
perma.cc/8CA5-X92K] (discussing result of O.M.’s case including steps already
taken by Portland Thorns to ensure law is being followed, minor player is offered
safe work environment).
168. See 29 C.F.R. § 570 (2017) (citing to restrictions employers must meet to
stay in compliance with FLSA).
169. See Kassouf, supra note 167 (noting Portland Thorns submitted compliance plan to league but team did not publicly release what was in compliance plan,
how it complied with FLSA, or how team will ensure plan is followed). If the team
was to release their compliance plan, it would be helpful to other professional
teams and organizations that could find themselves in this situation one day soon.
See id. (commenting on how Portland Thorns did not publicly release compliance
plan present to league, but if they had, it would likely be helpful to other leagues
or teams)
170. See id. (noting Portland Thorns’ compliance plan never became public
but it is reasonable to suspect what it will contain based on FLSA).
171. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 570.35 (2010) (identifying Portland Thorns’
main issue in compliance plan for O.M. because regulation lays out general
requirements).
172. See id. (identifying compliance plan’s specific requirements). The schedule of the minor compared to that of the other players will be the largest discrep-
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minor clock in and out.173 By ensuring teams comply with all the
main points, their compliance plans should be sufficiently clear,
precise, and comprehensive to contract with minors.174
However, it is possible that Congress and the Department of
Labor could, as they have before, create an FLSA exemption for
professional athletes.175 This would be similar in substance and
function to the Department of Labor’s exemption for child actors.176 In addition to child labor restrictions, professional leagues
and teams should also be aware of other legal implications.177 Minors do not have the legal capacity to consent to medical treatment
or other services.178 This could present clubs with an additional
ancy for teams to decide because of the heavily restricted hours of minors. See id.
(pointing to time restrictions imposed by statute).
173. See id. (noting suggestions to help comply with Section 570.35 because it
imposes extensive time regulations on the work of minors).
174. See id. (noting following restrictive hours should lead to compliance overall because if teams submit compliance plans following Section 570.35, likelihood
of them violating FLSA is lower).
175. See Exemptions to the FLSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
general/topic/youthlabor/exemptionsflsa [https://perma.cc/MVQ5-EQSC] (last
visited March 9, 2022) (noting there is opportunity for Congress to add amendment to FLSA or for Department of Labor to issue regulation in addition to FLSA
as has been done with all of current child labor regulations in addition to FLSA).
For reference, the Department of Labor has issued 29 C.F.R.§ 570.35 to further
explain and regulate Section 212 of the FLSA. See id. (identifying source of Department of Labor’s intentions behind additional regulations). The FLSA is short
in its explanation on the child labor provision and therefore it was necessary for
the Department of Labor to issue further regulations to ensure the provision is
enforced and to give employers a clearer idea of what they can and cannot require
of minor employees. See id. (noting length, depth of Department of Labor’s regulation exceeds FLSA).
176. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.125 (stating entertainers are exempt from FLSA coverage). This regulation exemption particularly states that minors who are employed as “actor[s] or performer[s] in motion pictures or theatrical productions,
or in radio or television productions” do not need to comply with the FLSA regulation. See id. (explaining actors’ exemption, performers’ exemption under FLSA).
The Department of Labor exempts these groups of minors from rules regarding
the number of hours minors can work in one day and the timeframes in which
they are allowed to work. See id. (referencing child labor laws this exemption applies to).
177. For further discussion of other concerns that will be presented to
leagues outside of child labor laws, see infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
178. See Anna Rabe, Working With Minor Athletes – Special Legal Issues, FITLEGALLY (last visited March 9, 2022), https://www.fitlegally.com/blogs/news/working-with-minor-athletes-special-legalissues?_pos=1&_psq=working+with&_ss=e&_v=1.0 [https://perma.cc/SDK5-EFJX]
(discussing special legal issues arising when working with minors). This is not an
exhaustive list of legal issues that could arise in the course of working with minors
in any sport setting, but it is a start for leagues and teams to be aware of for not
only coaches but all of the professional staff. See id. (discussing list presented in
article not only addresses legal implications that would be presented, but is useful
because “being forewarned is to be forearmed”).
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problem of requiring the minor’s parents to sign off on everything
done for them or to have parents sign waivers prior to contracting
with minors.179 Minors working as professional athletes is an area
of the law that is just beginning to develop and because athletes are
not included in entertainers, they are not exempt from FLSA, for
now.180
IV. GO, FIGHT, WIN! THIS

IS NOT THE

END

Placing age restrictions on players in the United States has resulted in many lawsuits under the Sherman Antitrust Act.181 These
restrictions have, in most cases, not been a result of collective bargaining agreements, which the courts have found to be a permissible way of imposing an age restriction.182 As a result, age
restrictions have been lifted because they violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.183 However, courts have neglected to speak
on how these young players will affect professional teams’ operations in a way ensuring compliance with state and federal child labor laws.184 The question now is whether states or Congress will
take the next step in addressing how to classify minor professional
athletes, and whether the federal government will create additional
FLSA exemptions.185 Even further pressing is whether the Department of Labor will address this issue.186 The Department of Labor
has attempted to keep track of states that regulate child entertainment but has yet to address if these states include athletes or if the
Department of Labor is willing to issue further guidance on the
179. See id. (noting need for medical waivers to be signed by parents). Ensuring that waivers are signed for treatment of minor athletes is imperative because
minors are still developing and are vulnerable and more susceptible to injury, and
without a waiver teams and leagues leave their staff open to liability. See id. (noting
higher likelihood minor athletes sustain injury over adult counterparts).
180. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 213(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2021) (noting exemption does
not mention minors who enter professional sports as being entertainers or being
exempt from FLSA restrictions on child labor).
181. For further discussion of Sherman Antitrust Act cases in professional
sports, see supra notes 32–45 and 87 and accompanying text.
182. See O.M., 544 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1074 (D. Or. 2021) (noting courts, in
case of professional sports leagues, have held rules created through collective bargaining agreements are exempt from Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
183. For further discussion of case results, see supra notes 109–124 and accompanying text.
184. For further discussion of judicial inaction, see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
185. For further discussion of inaction by the government, see supra note 135
and accompanying text.
186. For further discussion of the Department of Labor’s impact on the topic,
see supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text.
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topic.187 Due to the inactivity by the Department of Labor, minors
under the age of sixteen who are employed as professional athletes
will be subject to child labor laws imposed by both their state and
the FLSA.188 It is hopeful that because some states have already
started to address the topic, the law will catch up before too many
minors enter the professional ranks.189
Kacey McCann*
187. See Child Entertainment Laws As of January 1, 2022, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor/entertainment [https://
perma.cc/D76X-JCJ7] (last visited March 9, 2022) (noting interactive map, list Department of Labor provides on its website regarding child entertainment laws in
different states).
188. See 29 U.S.C.S. § 212 (LexisNexis 1938) (noting child labor provision of
FLSA is baseline start when complying with child labor laws, regulations).
189. For further discussion of how a few states have attempted to address the
child professional athlete issue, see supra note 156–157.
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